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In the economic debate on power, seemingly opposite positions have been presented. 
Contractualists have claimed that power relations do not exist in capitalism, and radicals have 
maintained that they are ubiquitous. In the middle, transaction costs and property rights economists 
have argued that power relations exist only within the firm. The underlying conception, however, 
is the same: power is an interpersonal relation caused by imperfections in the decision-making 
context and is incompatible with Walrasian competition. The difference among these theories 
involves their viewpoints on the concrete spread of imperfections in reality. The thesis of this 
paper is that this narrow conception of power is a consequence of neoclassical methodology. 
Following Marx, I analyze power as a social relation, and I discuss three problematic aspects of 
the neoclassical conception: its individualistic methodology, the assumption of universal rather 
than historical categories, and an ontology that conflates production and circulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of power in economics came to the forefront of the academic debate in the 
seventies, mainly as a byproduct of the debate on the nature of the firm, with contrasting 
contributions from Stephen Marglin (1974, 1975) on the one hand and Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) on the other. The former argues that power relations play a decisive role in the 
organization of the firm; the latter contend that formal authority within the firm is only an 
appearance that hides a reality of perfect reciprocal freedom. However, Ronald Coase’s 
(1937) paper on the nature of the firm is in the background. In this paper, Coase explicitly sets 
the mechanisms of authority and command within the firm against the market price 
mechanism as alternative modes of coordination. 
Recall that Coase’s paper is not about the nature of capitalist power relations; rather, it 
addresses “the nature of the firm” in capitalism. From a Marxist perspective, such a problem 
may appear trivial because the firm is an integral part of the capitalist system. Therefore, 
Marxists suggest that by analyzing the historical origin and developments of capitalism one 
can understand the nature of the firm and of the other institutions of capitalism. 
This problem, however, is anything but trivial if it is placed within the context of 
neoclassical economics, a context in which economic institutions are seen as universal and 
everlasting, like the economic problem they solve: the allocation of scarce resources. In 
neoclassical economics, the firm and the market are two alternative allocative mechanisms. 
The theoretical problem is that in the general equilibrium model, coordination between 
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isolated individuals, both in the sphere of production and in that of consumption, occurs 
entirely within the market, which makes all other institutions economically redundant. The 
story told to describe the general equilibrium model sometimes refers to the firm and to other 
institutions (such as the family), but analytically, they are superfluous add-ons. This leaves 
the internal relations of the firm undetermined. As Paul Samuelson (1957, p. 894) put it, “In a 
perfectly competitive model, it really doesn’t matter who hires whom; so let labor hire 
capital.” 
The general equilibrium model, like any theoretical model, is defined by a “decision 
making context” (DMC) and an “organizational structure” (OS). The former defines the 
features of the world in which agents of the model live and interact; the latter defines the 
relations among them and the way in which they interact. The DMC of the Walrasian model 
is characterized by perfect information, full rationality, and zero transaction costs. In this 
paper, I will refer to it as the “perfect” DMC. The OS is completely decentralized, based on 
market relations and perfect competition.  
Starting from the fact that the firm is redundant within the Walrasian model, Coase 
raises two scientific questions: Why do hierarchies exist in the market system? What is the 
source of power relations within the firm? These questions can be approached in many ways. 
Coase’s method consists of exploring the reasons why authority and direction may be 
economically superior to market relations in a context of positive transaction costs. 
Methodologically, Coase rejects the perfect DMC and investigates how OSs with some 
degree of centralization might perform better than the Walrasian one. Within this logic, 
Coase’s explanation of the nature of the firm insists on the existence within the firm of a 
relation of formal authority that is absent in the market. Thus, in one way or another, Coase 
introduces a form of power in the neoclassical model and uses it to analytically characterize 
the firm as an institution that is qualitatively distinct from the market. If power is the ability to 
condition the behaviors of other individuals, then authority is the strongest form of power 
because it implies that one subject orders and the other obeys. 
Theoretically, the introduction of authority as a specific coordination mechanism 
operating within the firm solves the problem (the nature of the firm). However, it disrupts the 
harmonious vision of interpersonal relations provided by Walras' model. From the viewpoint 
of the liberal doctrine, the problem is thus to reconstruct a harmonious vision of spontaneous 
(and possibly Pareto-efficient) interactions in a context in which, alongside the competitive 
mechanism of the market, there exists a mechanism of command working within the firm. 
Some forty years after its publication, Coase’s paper has become the starting point for 
a new research program aiming to explain all the institutions of capitalism and their internal 
power relations. This research program has been developed, in particular, by the new 
institutional economics. In my interpretation of this school of thought, research has developed 
along two distinct lines. In the former, Coase’s intuition has been developed by denying the 
existence of real authority relations within the firm and by explaining the mechanism of 
command as a specific form of competition. The main exponents of this line of research are 
Alchian and Demsetz. In the second approach, the costs and benefits of competition and 
command have been analyzed systematically in an attempt to determine the virtues and vices 
of markets and hierarchies. Oliver Williamson’s transaction costs economics and the property 
rights theory of Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore are the main contributors to 
this line.1 Outside of new institutional economics, this research on power and the institutions 
                                                 
1
 In Palermo (2000), I argue that new institutional economics fails both in its attempts (1) to theoretically 
characterize the capitalist firm and (2) to analyze power relations in capitalism. In Ankarloo and Palermo (2004), 
we focus the critique on Williamson’s transaction costs economics. 
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of capitalism has been developed, in particular, by exponents of radical political economics, 
such as Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, and of the institutional school, such as Victor 
Goldberg. 
Although all these approaches have confronted each other in harsh polemical tones, 
my thesis is that the common acceptance of neoclassical methodology (and its implicit 
ontology) has allowed rich exchanges between them and has produced a convergence toward 
a common conception of power, as an exception to Walrasian competition. By contrast, 
Marxist contributions, based on a different method, have remained mainly at the margins of 
the debate and, when discussed explicitly, have often been misinterpreted and read with 
neoclassical lenses. This problem does not involve only historians of economic thought. 
Rather, I argue that the neoclassical method engenders a narrow conception of power as a 
purely interpersonal relation, which incorporates all the contradictions noted by Marx against 
the bourgeois political economy: its ahistoricity, its inability to explain social relations and 
causal mechanisms that cannot be reduced to intentional choice, and its focus on exchange 
rather than production.  
I begin by reviewing the main theoretical approaches developed in the debate. Then, I 
single out the common methodological and ontological traits of these approaches, and I 
propose a representation in terms of set theory of their different positions concerning the 
extension of power relations in capitalism. Finally, I criticize this conception of power and 
contrast it with an alternative conception based on Marx's understanding of power and 
exploitation as social, rather than interpersonal, relations. 
 
 
2. The debate on power 
 
 The contractual approach of Alchian and Demsetz 
 
The idea that capitalism is characterized by the absence of any substantial power 
relations among individuals has been vigorously defended by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
Their paper is one of the most frequently cited contributions to interpersonal relations within 
the firm and has become the starting point for a new theoretical approach. In their “property 
rights approach”, they explicitly deny the existence of any form of power or authority even in 
contexts in which, according to many, these forms are clearly manifest. 
The authors consider production within the firm the result of the cooperation of 
individuals belonging to a team. The essential feature of team production is the impossibility 
of determining the relative contribution of each component of the team to the final 
production, which makes it difficult (1) to fix the efficient remuneration of the different work 
activities and (2) to prevent negligent and free-riding behaviors within the team. Such 
difficulties raise a problem of monitoring. Based on the assumption that the benefits of 
monitoring (the increase of overall productivity) are greater than its costs (the wage of the 
monitor), it follows that there is an incentive to establish a monitor. The monitor, however, 
has no real power over the other members of the team because he is subject to the same 
discipline imposed by market competition: he would be replaced as soon as another member 
of the team offered the same monitoring activity at a lower price. In this way, Alchian and 
Demsetz bring all the relations within the firm back to market relations and show that 
hierarchy within the firm is only apparent. This is how they discuss the employer-worker 
relationship. 
 
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by 
disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional market. This is delusion. The firm 
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does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any 
different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people. I can 
“punish” you only by withholding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any 
failure to honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all that any employer can do. He can fire 
or sue, just as I can fire my grocer by stopping purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty 
products. (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, p. 777) 
 
According to Alchian and Demsetz, the reason power relations should have no place in 
theory is that they do not exist in reality. Additionally, the opposition between firms and 
markets is only illusory. The market is universal, and perfect competition is always at work, 
even within the firm. The firm is nothing but a particular form of the market – one in which 
price is not continually re-negotiated, although the outcome is as if it were.  
This position has been abundantly criticized by Marxist historians and radical 
economists who, in contrast, see the organization of the firm as strictly dependent on the 
question of power (Braverman 1974, Marglin 1974, 1975, Edwards 1979). But perhaps the 
best way to appreciate the limits of this approach is by following its internal development and 
its inevitable dead end. 
To deny the existence of power relations within the firm, Alchian’s pupil, Stephen 
Cheung, finds nothing better than denying the existence of the firm itself as an object of the 
social realm. In his view, what we generally call a “firm” is, in fact, simply a complex nexus 
of market contracts. The firm itself is a sort of market and is thus theoretically 
indistinguishable from it. Hence, the concept of the firm is unimportant and theoretically 
useless. No one is clearer than the author himself: 
 
It is often the case that the entrepreneur who holds employment contracts (and it is not clear 
whether it is the entrepreneur who employs the worker or the worker who employs the 
entrepreneur) may contract with other firms; a contractor may sub-contract; a sub-contractor may 
sub-sub-contract further; and a worker may contract with a number of “employers” or “firms”. ... 
With this approach the size of the firm becomes indeterminate and unimportant. (Cheung 1987, p. 
57) 
 
If we cannot in any meaningful economic sense identify “firms”, as separate entities, we do not 
know what a firm is when we see one in the real world. (Cheung 1992, p. 56) 
 
Cheung’s contribution is peculiar: he assumes that markets are universal and everlasting and, 
on this basis, carries Alchian and Demsetz’s approach to its logical conclusion. Faced with the 
inevitable conflict between his theory and reality, Cheung rejects, on theoretical grounds, the 
existence of the reality he wished to explain. In his theory of the firm, firms do not exist!2 
 
 
 Williamson’s transaction costs economics 
 
Williamson’s (1975, 1985, 1994, 1996) contributions constitute the most systematic 
attempt to approach the problem of institutions within new institutional economics. His 
market/hierarchies framework is explicitly defined within an individualist methodology and is 
developed by means of neoclassical analytical tools. However, Williamson explicitly 
distances himself from the approach of Alchian and Demsetz: 
 
The argument that the firm “has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different 
                                                 
2
 Gary Becker’s (1992, p. 68) comment to Cheung (1992) is sharp: “We generally know a firm when we see 
one”. 
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in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p.777) is 
exactly wrong: firms can and do exercise fiat that markets cannot. (Williamson 1994, p. 325) 
 
In Williamson’s theory, firms are explained by determining the conditions that make a 
centralized OS more efficient than the market in a context of positive transaction costs. His 
method can be described as follows. He assumes “for expositional convenience, that ‘in the 
beginning there were markets’” (1975, p. 20) and, through successive exercises in 
comparative statics, introduces non-market institutions – based on different forms of 
hierarchy and authority – every time the market fails to allocate resources efficiently. Finally, 
by interpreting these comparative statics exercises as if they described a real historical 
process, Williamson provides his explanation of the existing institutional configuration of 
modern capitalist economies. 
In this approach, markets and hierarchies are considered alternative instruments to the 
same end (to complete transactions), and their existence is explained in terms of their relative 
efficiency. If markets and hierarchies coexist in reality, it is because transaction costs prevent 
either of them from solving the entire allocation problem efficiently. Their relation is thus one 
of substitution. Once hierarchy is introduced, the (virtual) process of substitution proceeds 
until the economic benefits of centralization exceed the economic costs. In this way, 
Williamson explains not only the nature of the firm but also its boundaries because the 
optimal degree of centralization defines the optimal dimension of the firm. 
Williamson’s “market and hierarchies” framework is built on three theoretical 
categories: (1) opportunism, (2) bounded rationality, and (3) asset specificity. The 
simultaneous presence of (1), (2), and (3) produces transaction costs and prevents any single 
institution from allocating resources efficiently. The advantages of hierarchy over the market 
stem from the fact that hierarchy (1) reduces opportunism (both by means of authority and by 
stimulating solidarity), (2) attenuates problems stemming from bounded rationality (by 
facilitating adaptive sequential decision-making processes in situations in which contracts on 
the contingent states of nature are not possible and spot markets are risky), and (3) lowers 
bargaining costs caused by asset specificity (both through authority and by generating 
convergent expectations between the parties). The benefits of markets with respect to 
hierarchy include (1) the incentive mechanism of competition and (2) the growing 
diseconomies associated with hierarchical organization. 
The assumption of bounded rationality as an initial category of Williamson’s 
framework is problematic and, as we will see, is abandoned in the development of the new 
property rights school. In fact, this assumption conflicts with the fundamental assumption of 
Williamson’s method, namely that institutional evolution follows economic efficiency. Put 
simply, on the one hand, individuals are supposed to be rationally bounded; on the other hand, 
their sub-optimal decisions are supposed to select optimal institutional configurations (cf. 
Mark Granovetter 1985, Geoffrey Hodgson 1993). 
The first application of the market and hierarchies framework concerns the work 
relation. As Christos Pitelis (1991, p. 13) notes, this application is particularly important 
because only the work relation can explain the emergence of hierarchies from a situation of 
pure markets. All other applications of Williamson’s framework (vertical integration, M-
form, conglomerates) presuppose the existence of the firm and thus address the problem of 
the evolution of the firm, not its origins. The (hierarchical) work relation represents, in the 
story that starts “in the beginning there were markets”, the first suppression of the market. All 
other changes in the internal structure of the firm and in the relations among firms are 
subsequent and presuppose a certain degree of hierarchy (i.e., the existence of a work 
relation). If at time 0 there were only markets, at time 1 there are markets and hierarchical 
work relations (i.e., firms). Then, from time 2 onward, the more complex forms of power 
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relations can develop. 
The importance of the work relation in the explanation of the firm makes 
Williamson’s framework unlike Alchian and Demsetz’s approach. Williamson’s framework 
implies (1) a clear-cut distinction between the firm and the market based on the 
presence/absence of hierarchical relations and (2) a distinction between the work relation and 
other economic relations (such as the grocer-customer relation).  
 
 
 The property rights approach of Grossman, Hart, and Moore 
 
The new theory of property rights (or simply “the theory of property rights”) 
developed by Grossman, Hart, and Moore finds its inspiration in the original contribution of 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972). At the same time, it aims to overcome the lack of formal 
analysis of transaction costs economics, whose arguments have been developed mainly 
verbally (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1990, 1995, Hart and Moore 1988, 1990, Moore 
1992). As far as the issue of power is concerned, this theory is closer to the approach of 
Williamson (so much so that it is often presented as a sophisticated version of it) and reaches, 
in many ways, quite opposite conclusions with respect to the original property rights theory of 
Alchian and Demsetz.  
Like transaction costs economics, the property rights school assumes an imperfect 
DMC in which contracts are necessarily incomplete. However, contract incompleteness 
depends solely on imperfect information, as in Alchian and Demsetz’s approach, unlike 
Williamson’s theory, in which it also depends on bounded rationality. According to Hart 
(1990), the problem is not that agents are not capable of conceiving of all possible 
contingencies but rather that it is impossible, or extremely costly, for a third party (a tribunal) 
to verify the execution of the contract. In other words, individuals are not bounded in their 
cognitive abilities but in their ability to communicate to a third party the terms of their 
agreement. Bounded rationality is thus unimportant for a theory of institutions. Therefore, this 
approach overcomes the contradiction between rationally bounded individuals and efficient 
institutional arrangements that characterizes Williamson’s framework. 
Grossman, Hart, and Moore analyze the problem of when transactions should be 
conducted within a firm or through the market. They classify contractual rights into two 
categories: specific and residual rights. The former are the rights explicitly specified in the 
contract; the latter are the rights to use assets according to one’s wishes in all cases not 
mentioned in the contract. Residual rights are conferred by ownership. The owner of an asset 
can decide how it should be used and by whom (of course, within the constraints imposed by 
law and specific contracts). In particular, he is entitled to prevent the other party from using 
his assets in case of disputes. When, for party A, the cost of listing all specific rights over an 
asset of party B is high, it might be optimal for party A to purchase all residual rights. In this 
way, by assuming ownership of the specific asset, A acquires the residual rights of control 
over it and can dispose of it as he wishes.  
With this classification, the authors provide a straightforward definition of the firm 
and its boundaries with the market. A firm is identified with the physical assets its owners 
control. If two assets have the same owner, then they form a single, integrated firm; if they 
have different owners, then they form two separate firms, and the relation between them is a 
market one. Decisions about integration or non-integration are important because control over 
assets gives the owner decision-making power in the event of unforeseen contingencies. This 
situation has consequences both on the grounds of efficiency and on the grounds of power 
relations. From the viewpoint of efficiency, this approach studies how changes in ownership 
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affect the incentives of both workers and owner-managers. With respect to the famous Coase 
(1960) theorem, contract incompleteness implies that the distribution of property rights has 
efficiency consequences. In contrast to transaction costs economics, Grossman, Hart, and 
Moore argue that the relevant comparison is not between the non-integrated outcome and the 
complete contract outcome; this would assume that integration yields the outcome that would 
arise under complete contracts. In a context of imperfect information and asset specificity, 
however, integration does not remove the incentives for opportunistic behavior; it simply 
modifies them depending on which party purchases residual rights. In any case, opportunism 
creates distortions that prevent the theoretical first-best solution – defined under complete 
contracts – from being obtained. Therefore, the relevant comparison is between three 
necessarily inefficient situations: non-integration and integration with either A or B acquiring 
residual rights. 
Ownership of physical assets, however, is a matter not only of efficiency but also of 
power. According to this approach, the power of the boss over the worker is a consequence of 
his ownership of physical assets within a context of imperfect information. As Moore (1992, 
p. 496-7) puts it, “A boss exerts authority over workers because, in the event of a dispute, he 
can deny access to important physical assets”. This solves the paradox of Alchian and 
Demsetz’s grocer, based on the assumption that the work relation is not qualitatively different 
from any other market relation: 
 
When a customer “fires” Alchian and Demsetz’s grocer, the grocer (being a separate contractor) 
gets to keep the store; whereas if the grocer were an employee of the customer, the customer (the 
boss) could deny the grocer (the worker) access to the store, and could hire another grocer on the 
spot labor market. (Moore 1992, p. 497) 
 
Methodologically, there are no significant differences between the approach of 
Grossman, Hart, and Moore and the contractualist one. However, their theoretical treatment of 
imperfections leads to opposite conclusions, to the point that Hart (1995, p. 5) suggests, 
“Given its concern with power, the approach proposed (...) has something in common with 
Marxian theories of the capitalist-worker relationship”. We will see, however, that this 
similarity is only formal and that the different method followed by Marx, which is not based 
on "imperfections", leads to a completely different conception of power relations in 
capitalism. 
 
 
 The radical political economics of Bowles and Gintis 
 
The “post-Walrasian” approach of Bowles and Gintis is an attempt to show that power 
relations are not confined within the firm but exist in competitive markets as well (Bowles 
1985, Bowles and Gintis 1988, 1993a, 1993b, 2000). Bowles and Gintis define competition as 
a situation characterized by free entry and large numbers of buyers and sellers but not by 
market clearing. With this definition, the authors demonstrate that even in competitive 
equilibrium (with non-clearing markets), a market economy sustains a system of power 
relations among agents (a competitive equilibrium is a situation in which actors are incapable 
of improving their position by altering variables over which they have control). This result is 
obtained by relaxing one of the assumptions of the Walrasian DMC that Bowles and Gintis 
(like Grossman, Hart, and Moore) consider the most implausible: the assumption that contract 
enforcement by a third party is costless and unproblematic. 
Bowles and Gintis (1993a, p. 325) define power as “the capacity of some agents to 
influence the behavior of others to their advantage through the threat of imposing sanctions”. 
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The absence of power relations in the Walrasian model is a consequence of the condition that 
supply equals demand, which implies that each agent loses nothing by abandoning his optimal 
transaction in favor of his next best alternative. In equilibrium, the cost to agent B of 
foregoing an exchange with agent A is zero, so A cannot affect B’s wellbeing by terminating 
the relation. Hence, Bowles and Gintis continue, A has no power over B. More generally, the 
fact that no agent can impose sanctions on other agents in Walrasian equilibria implies that 
the economy works without any underlying power relation among agents. 
If contract enforcement is problematic, however, the picture changes radically. In the 
case of the employer-worker relationship, for instance, “while the employer’s promise to pay 
the wage is legally enforceable, the worker’s promise to bestow an adequate level of effort … 
is not” (Bowles and Gintis 1993a, p.333). Other examples studied by Bowles and Gintis are 
the relationships between an owner and manager, a lender and borrower, and between parties 
in international exchanges (Gintis 1989, Bowles, Gintis, and Gustafsson 1993, Bowles and 
Gintis 1994). In all these cases, competitive equilibrium is characterized by non-clearing 
markets, and agents on the short side of the market have power over agents on the long side 
with whom they transact (where excess supply exists, the demand side is the short one, and 
vice versa). The cause of this power relation is that the agents on the long side who are lucky 
enough to enter the relation with agents on the short side enjoy a “rent” (defined as the 
difference between the utility they obtain due to the transaction and the utility they will have 
if the transaction terminates), which is costly for them to lose. The fact that within imperfect 
DMCs, perfectly competitive markets do not necessarily clear produces an asymmetry 
between the two sides of the market, which, in turn, conditions interpersonal relations 
between single buyers and sellers. 
In the case of the work relation, employers are on the short side of the labor market, 
and workers are on the long one. Employers thus have power over workers, and workers 
enjoy the so-called “employment rent” (similarly, Bowles and Gintis show that creditors have 
power over debtors, and owners of enterprises have power over managers). This rent is the 
instrument by which the employer places the worker under constant threat and pushes him to 
provide an adequate level of effort at work. 
Bowles and Gintis’ theory indirectly sheds light on the theoretical consistency of 
Alchian and Demsetz’s claim that intra-firm relations are power-free. In fact, within non-
clearing markets, contrary to what Alchian and Demsetz assume, free-contracting engenders 
power relations between the parties. The problem of Alchian and Demsetz’s approach can 
thus be seen as follows: to say that the firm is a form of (competitive) market is not sufficient 
to prove that intra-firm relations are power-free simply because, as Bowles and Gintis 
demonstrate, perfectly competitive markets within an imperfect DMC can still involve power. 
If Alchian and Demsetz had remained coherent with their imperfect DMC, they would have 
realized that, in an imperfect grocers market, they could no longer fire their grocer at zero 
cost. 
With respect to new institutionalism, Bowles and Gintis provide a completely different 
picture of capitalism. They show that (non-Walrasian) competitive equilibria are generally 
characterized by involuntary unemployment and by wage differentials based on gender or 
race (or on other characteristics that have nothing to do with productivity), that the democratic 
firm is superior to the capitalist one, and that capitalism is technologically inefficient. Most 
importantly, the result that power relations exist even under voluntary market exchange 
collapses the picture of a harmonious society that is provided by standard Walrasian 
economics and reconstructed by new institutional economics. Outside the Walrasian world, 
when markets do not necessarily clear, the market can no longer be seen as an arena of free 
interactions devoid of coercion, as liberal political philosophy suggests. Notwithstanding 
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these theoretical differences, Bowles and Gintis’ conception of power coincides with that of 
new institutional economics: power is understood as a consequence of imperfections and is 
analyzed by introducing transaction costs in an otherwise perfect DMC. 
Methodologically and theoretically, there is also a large convergence between Bowles 
and Gintis' approach and the efficiency wages literature, focusing on workers’ “shirking” in 
the presence of imperfect information and incomplete contracts (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, 
Akerlof and Yellen 1986). In both cases, a wage higher than the market clearing one is a 
device to induce the worker to work harder than he wishes. The only difference is that radicals 
note the implications in terms of power relations, whereas this branch of new Keynesianism 
insists on inefficiencies (rigorously speaking, this issue has to do with productivity, not with 
efficiency, because total output is increased by increasing the amount of one input, namely 
labor). However, they share the idea that imperfections are the causal factors of power and 
inefficiency. In the words of Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz (1993, p. 24), “Modern 
Keynesians have identified these real world ‘imperfections’ as the source of the problem: 
leaving them out of the model is like leaving Hamlet out of the play”.  
 
 
 Goldberg’s institutional perspective 
 
Things are no different with Goldberg’s (1976, 1980) theory, which aims to build a 
bridge between new institutional economics and radical economics (Goldberg takes 
Williamson and Richard Edwards as spokespersons of these economic schools). Although he 
is close to the old American institutional tradition, Goldberg develops this exercise by 
following methodological individualism. First, however, let us consider Edwards’ position. 
By explicitly referring to Marx (1867), Edwards reconsiders the distinction between 
labor and labor power: labor power, which is the commodity that the employer buys, is the 
capacity to perform certain types of productive activity; labor is the active, concrete process 
performed by the worker. Actual labor activity is determined not only by labor power but also 
by the ability of the employer to extract labor from labor power. In Edwards, as well as in 
Marx, this distinction is used to explain exploitation (exploitation is seen here as a 
manifestation of economic power).  
The process of the extraction of labor from labor power has been the object of a wide 
research program within the Marxist-radical tradition. Edwards, in particular, notes that in this 
concrete process, there may be a discrepancy between what the employer buys in the market 
and what he needs for production. In Goldberg’s reading of Edwards, this discrepancy is due 
to imperfections in the DMC. He thus assumes a DMC of imperfect information, 
opportunistic individuals, costly contract enforcement, and historical time. In such an 
imperfect DMC, the extraction of labor from labor power is problematic because 
imperfections prevent the parties from precisely knowing, at the time of contracting, the labor 
that will be extracted in the labor process. According to the author, this situation gives rise to 
discrepancies between promise and execution, making room for the exercise of power. In 
other words, Edwards’s claim that the labor contract is exploitative is not interpreted as a 
consequence of the class structure of the economy, as Edward himself suggests, but as a 
consequence of some empirical specificity of the work relation, such as the fact that working 
takes time and that information in the workplace is not perfect. The empirical attributes of the 
work relation are interpreted as causes of power in capitalism. 
However, Goldberg continues, a discrepancy between promise and execution may 
arise every time a relation between two parties is not instantaneous, as in the Walrasian world. 
Therefore, it is not peculiar to the employment relation, as Marxists contend, but 
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characterizes, to varying degrees, most exchange relations (Goldberg 1980, pp. 252-3). 
Goldberg concludes that power relations are not confined within the firm because an incentive 
not to keep a promise may emerge in several types of contractual relations, even outside the 
firm. 
Also in this case, power relations exist only if contracting is problematic, and 
problematic contracting is a consequence of imperfections in the DMC. Rather than a bridge 
between new institutionalism and Marxism, Goldberg's theory is a neoclassical interpretation 
of Marx, which leads to a conception of power that, in many respects, is the opposite of the 
Marxian one. Theories of value and exploitation are not seen as essential aspects of Marx's 
work of the demystification of the capitalist mode of production but as useless social notions 
without implications in terms of interpersonal power relations. As I will show, for Marx, 
capitalist exploitation has nothing to do with a discrepancy between promise and execution. 
On the contrary, Marx shows that capitalists promise to exploit workers, and the point is that 
they generally keep this promise. 
 
 
3. The terms of the debate 
  
 Common ontological premises 
 
All the approaches discussed above share the idea that power relations exist only 
within imperfect DMCs. Authors who explicitly adhere to the liberal doctrine believe that the 
perfect DMC is the rule in reality. In their view, this justifies the fact that economic theory 
ignores power relations, at least in its general formulation. By contrast, their rivals in the 
debate on power consider the Walrasian DMC unrealistic. With asymmetric information, 
uncertainty, historical time, bounded rationality, or other imperfections, they argue, 
interpersonal relations necessarily involve power.  
Ontologically, these apparently competing theories develop the same conception of 
reality, according to which the existence of power depends on the features of the DMC in 
which agents interact. In a perfect DMC, there is no room for power relations: the internal 
structure of the firm is irrelevant, and competition clears all markets; therefore, no one can 
have power over anyone else. In imperfect DMCs, by contrast, intra-firm relations affect the 
firm’s performance, and markets do not necessarily clear. In these circumstances, they argue, 
power relations can emerge both within the firm and within the market. Therefore, in all these 
theories, imperfections are the cause of power relations. Eliminate them, these authors 
maintain – either implicitly or explicitly – and power relations disappear. 
The problem of power is thus an empirical one, and its solution is to be found in the 
relevance of imperfections in the real world. According to this ontology, economic reality is 
split into two distinct closed systems: a system with no imperfection, in which interpersonal 
relations are governed by perfect competition, and a system with imperfections, in which 
power matters.  
Although this ontology remains mostly implicit in the discourse of mainstream 
economists, it is the sole justification of the neoclassical methodology, according to which 
economic reality must be explained by two (incompatible but complementary) sets of models: 
a model of Walrasian competition, explaining the relations within the perfect DMC, and a set 
of models of economic power, explaining interpersonal relations within the parts of the 
system characterized by imperfect DMCs (it goes without saying that the former defines the 
body of economic theory, whereas the latter serves to explain what the former cannot). 
At first sight, authors who consider imperfections pervasive in the real world do not 
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need this ontological assumption. Within the radical school, Ernesto Screpanti (2001, p. 145) 
is explicit on this point. He begins by defining a complex DMC characterized by bounded 
rationality, imperfect information, uncertainty, and various externalities and then affirms, 
"Perfect and atomistic competition cannot exist in this world, even as a limit case – I mean the 
neoclassical competition that eliminates all inefficiencies and power hubris". In his view, the 
perfect DMC is only a theoretical benchmark with no empirical counterpart. It is not an 
ontological entity of capitalist economies but a methodological tool of the economist. The 
model of perfect competition does not serve to understand how the real world works but how 
it does not work. On the contrary, to describe real capitalist economies, one must assume an 
imperfect DMC. With this interpretation, however, it is not clear why Screpanti and other 
neoclassical radicals choose this abstract fiction with no ontological role as the theoretical 
benchmark of their supposedly more realistic exercises. 
 
 
The ontology of power and competition 
 
This underlying ontology explains why theoretical investigations of power relations 
start from the firm, a domain in which hierarchy and authority are so evident as to be 
considered the phenomena to explain. In a first stage of the debate, the fact that market 
relations have been depicted as power-free has led to an analysis of power (within the firm) as 
an exception to the general model (of the market). This situation has led to the question of 
“the boundaries of the firm”, as if the firm, with its authority relations, were antagonistic to 
the market, with its power-free relations. In this way, the complementary role of the firm and 
the market in capitalism is necessarily lost. The successive step in the debate, consisting of 
questioning the assumption that power is effectively confined within the firm, finally leads to 
a more accurate redefinition of the problem. The theoretical question becomes the following: 
where are the boundaries of economic power? To put it in the antagonist terms of this 
approach, where is the demarcation line between power and power-free relations? 
With this narrow definition of the problem, the sphere of existence of power relations 
and that of power-free relations can be represented in terms of set theory. The set of existing 
economic relations can be divided into two disjoint subsets according to the absence/presence 
of imperfections in the DMC. The borderline between these subsets separates the parts of the 
world in which interpersonal relations are governed by Walrasian competition from those in 
which they are governed by power. This ontology can be represented graphically with the 
convention that the perfect DMC is on the left of the borderline and imperfect DMCs are on 
the right.  
 
 
Figure 1.   The boundaries of economic power 
 
 
           Borderline 
 
   PERFECT DMC   IMPERFECT DMCS 
       (Walrasian competition)        (Power relations) 
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If we allow the borderline to move from left to right, the sphere of existence of power 
relations is progressively compressed. As limit cases, if the borderline is at the left boundary 
of economic relations, we have a conception according to which power relations embrace the 
entire economy. If it is at the right boundary, we have a conception of the economy as 
involving no power relations, formally represented by the general equilibrium model. 
 
 
Liberals, radicals, and the boundaries of power 
 
In this representational scheme, the approach of Alchian and Demsetz is the most 
radical one on the right-hand side. They see perfect competition everywhere, even when this 
mode of interaction is actually suppressed by other economic mechanisms.  
 
 
Figure 2.    The terms of the debate 
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For this reason, they deny the existence of any power relation in the economy and 
compress the sphere of existence of power into the empty set. Their underlying DMC, 
however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, to explain the firm, Alchian and Demsetz explicitly 
introduce imperfect information in the DMC; on the other hand, they implicitly assume a 
perfect DMC when they claim that the employer has no real power over his workers. Faced 
with this contradiction, the authors remain caught in the middle. However, Cheung takes a 
well-defined route: to coherently defend the thesis that there is no power in capitalism, he 
returns to the perfect DMC, a context in which power relations disappear but the firm 
disappears as well, exactly as in the general equilibrium model. 
In contrast to this position, new institutional economists, such as Williamson, 
Grossman, Hart, and Moore, recognize that power relations do exist. They explicitly define 
imperfect DMCs to explain the firm and identify power relations with intra-firm relations. For 
this reason, they restrict the analysis of power relations to the particular forms that these 
relations acquire within the firm, namely, authority and hierarchy. At the same time, they 
concede that outside the firm, in the market, there is no room for power. Like Alchian, 
Demsetz, and Cheung, they assume that the boundaries of power coincide with those of the 
firm. Unlike these authors, however, Williamson, Grossman, Hart, and Moore do not see the 
firm as an implicit (perfectly competitive) market but rather as an alternative (and, under 
certain conditions, more efficient) allocative mechanism. 
Bowles and Gintis, on the one hand, and Goldberg, on the other, make a further step to 
the left and show that power relations exist even beyond the boundaries of the firm, to the 
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extent that markets are imperfect. It is not clear whether Bowles and Gintis push the 
borderline between power and perfect Walrasian competition to the far left boundary of 
economic relations. The authors explicitly contend that power relations are ubiquitous in real 
capitalist economies, which might suggest that there is no room for power-free relations in 
their conception. However, this is only because they see imperfections as pervasive in the real 
world. Just as for their less radical colleagues, the sphere of existence of power relations 
coincides with the diffusion of imperfections in the DMC. Therefore, if it happens in a 
particular market that demand equals supply, then their theory implies that within such a 
subset of the economic realm, interpersonal relations are power-free.3 Therefore, neoclassical 
radicals do not challenge the orthodox conception of power relations. Their radicalism 
consists simply of moving the borderline a bit more to the left. At the same time, however, it 
is entirely internal to the logic of mainstream economics, a logic according to which 
imperfections are the cause of power relations. 
 
 
4. A Marxist critique 
 
Imperfections and the ahistorical conception of capitalism 
 
The idea that imperfections in the DMC are the cause of capitalist power relations 
engenders a tension with history. Before capitalism, in this conception, there was no 
feudalism or other modes of production, but Léon Walras. Indeed, the nature of capitalist 
power relations is not studied as a transformation of the power relations that regulated the 
modes of production that preceded capitalism. Rather, it is explained as a deviation of real 
capitalism from the abstract model of complete and perfect markets. 
Bounded rationality, imperfect information, and historical time, however, are not 
specific to capitalism. Rather, they are features of all human relations in any historical 
context. Therefore, according to this logic based on imperfections, power relations are a 
constant of any social system. This is not the time to discuss whether this statement is right or 
wrong. For instance, in the Marxist tradition, all societies based on a certain division of labor 
and a degree of specialization of their members are considered to be necessarily based on 
power relations. The problem involves the attempt to explain historical processes by means of 
ahistorical categories.  
Such a method implies that power relations have always existed, even before the 
historical development of market relations and economic competition, although they have 
become visible only with the historical development of capitalism (and the consequent 
possibility of conceiving a model of complete markets and perfect competition). Neoclassical 
theorists of power must consider themselves very lucky to live in the sole epoch in which 
everlasting power relations have finally become visible, as an exception to the Walrasian 
model. 
The truth, however, is that market interaction and economic competition are not 
everlasting forms of social coordination. Markets have not always existed, and economic 
competition has become the main form of social coordination only in relatively recent times. 
If pre-capitalist systems with less developed or completely absent market relations were not 
regulated by economic competition, it cannot be because of market imperfections, as the 
                                                 
3
 Elsewhere, I have developed a Marxist view of power, and I have argued that capitalism is a system of power 
(Palermo 2007). Nevertheless, I would not locate my position on the far left boundary of economic relations 
because this representation presupposes an antagonism between power and Walrasian competition, which is 
meaningless from a Marxist perspective. 
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neoclassical method implies, but because of a lack of market relations.  
 
 
Free contracting and the Eden of the innate rights of man 
 
For Marx, free contracting is one of the historical conditions of the emergence of 
proper capitalistic relations. As he writes, for a capitalist-worker relation to emerge, the 
laborer must be free in a double sense: 
 
That as a free man, he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the 
other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realisation 
of his labour-power (Marx 1867, Chap. 6). 
 
Free contracting and the lack of the means of production are the two ingredients of 
capitalistic exploitation. There is no abuse or prevarication, no asymmetric information or 
bounded rationality, in the power relation of the capitalist over the worker. The fact that the 
worker must obey the capitalist is not even the essence of the problem for Marx. The power 
relation of the capitalist over the worker as individuals is simply a consequence of the 
relationship of exploitation that exists between their social classes. Therefore, Marx does not 
seek the coercive nature of capitalism in the interpersonal relationship between the single 
capitalist and the single worker but in the social mechanisms that separate the population in 
social classes and that reproduce such a social structure. 
In capitalism, the worker is not obliged to exchange his labor power with the wage of 
a particular capitalist, but he is obliged to exchange his labor power with the wage of a 
capitalist. If one follows an extreme individualist-voluntaristic approach, Alchian and 
Demsetz are right when they affirm that the worker is a free individual who can leave the 
capitalist whenever he wants. However, from a social perspective, the worker's freedom is 
very peculiar: he must obey a capitalist or choose another capitalist to obey (in fact, even this 
very peculiar choice exists only for particular categories of skilled workers, whereas unskilled 
workers can, at best, hope to be chosen by a capitalist). The worst thing that can happen to a 
worker in a society based on capital is to not find a capitalist wishing to command and exploit 
him. It is not a problem of uncertainty, bounded rationality, or asymmetric information. 
Rather, it is a form of social coercion imposed by class relations. 
Of course, within Marxism, "imperfections" modify interpersonal power relations. 
However, they do not create them. If a worker is not well informed or his rationality is 
bounded, he might accept worse conditions than his colleagues. Yet, even the most rational 
and well-informed worker will never get a job if he is not ready to obey and to be exploited. 
This is why, theoretically, Marx does not need to introduce imperfections in the DMC to 
explain the exploitative nature of capitalism and the power relationship of the capitalist over 
the worker. If capitalism is a system of exploitation and power relations, it is not because 
contracts are imperfect or incomplete but because capitalism is based on free contracts. The 
problem is not that contracts are occasionally violated, as the neoclassical method suggests, 
but that they are generally respected. 
By contrast, according to the neoclassical conception, a world of perfect information 
and free contracting is, by definition, a world free of power relations or, to use Marx's 
provocative expression, "the Eden of the innate rights of man". Power relations emerge only 
when contracts are not correctly executed. The fact that contracting agents might face 
completely different material constraints when they "freely" sign a contract is not seen as a 
potential cause of their contractual power relation. On the contrary, the implicit assumption is 
that contracts are signed in a vacuum in which only subjective choice matters.  
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Production, circulation, and the free trader vulgaris 
 
In capitalism, the terms of a contract are not determined simply by the wishes of the 
transacting parties. They are inevitably conditioned by the social context as well. The work 
contract, in particular, hides exploitative conditions that, according to Marx, are by nature 
social and do not necessarily appear directly at an interpersonal level. This is why he insists 
on the separation of the spheres of production and circulation. 
In the sphere of circulation, capitalists and workers do not appear, in the first instance, 
as social entities, but simply as individuals who buy and sell commodities. However, before 
they are exchanged, commodities must be produced. It is only when we enter the sphere of 
production that the social nature of capitalists and workers becomes evident: 
 
On leaving this sphere of simple circulation or of exchange of commodities, which furnishes the 
“Free-trader Vulgaris” with his views and ideas, and with the standard by which he judges a 
society based on capital and wages, we think we can perceive a change in the physiognomy of our 
dramatis personae. He, who before was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the 
possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, 
intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to 
market and has nothing to expect but — a hiding (Marx 1867, Chap. 6).  
 
By investigating the sphere of production, Marx argued that the working class is 
exploited and that the capitalist class appropriates a value it has not produced. This form of 
social exploitation is also the main cause of the asymmetry between capitalists and workers in 
the workplace. The need to control and supervise the production process is a consequence of 
the problematic process of extracting living labor from workers' labor power. Marx discusses 
this process in different parts of Capital and explains how the organization of the firm and its 
worker disciplining mechanism evolve according to the needs of capital accumulation. He 
notes, for instance, that the development of cooperative factories and stock companies are 
very different processes in many respects, but they are two ways for each individual capitalist 
to obtain the same goal: delegating the extraction of living labor to other subjects (the 
manager in one case and the worker in the other) (Marx 1894, chapter 27). 
Modern Marxists, such as Braverman (1974), Marglin (1974, 1975), and Edwards 
(1979), have developed this conception by discussing the evolution of class relationships and 
the development of different forms of power, authority, and hierarchy within capitalist firms 
in the twentieth century. Social exploitation and interpersonal power relations, in the work of 
these authors, are dialectically linked. On the one hand, exploitative class relations in society 
are the cause of the interpersonal power relations in the workplace; on the other hand, the 
evolution of the forms of power that prevail within capitalist firms modifies the overall rate of 
exploitation and class relations. 
By contrast, in the neoclassical approach, based on the sole sphere of circulation, the 
worker is not exploited at all. On the contrary, for a power relation to exist between the 
worker and the capitalist, the worker must collect rent from the latter. This rent, in an 
equilibrium position, is the compensation for the nuisance of being commanded. Thus, like 
other commodities, power has its equilibrium price, defined as the amount of money used to 
compensate the worker to insure that he will not use his informative advantages 
opportunistically. 
We can appreciate the distance between Marxism and the parts of the radical school 
based on methodological individualism and pure circulation. Both of them formally conclude 
that the capitalist has power over the worker. For Marx, however, this interpersonal power 
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relation is a consequence of a social asymmetry in the sphere of production. For Bowles, 
Gintis, and their neoclassical colleagues, by contrast, it is a consequence of individual 
asymmetries in the sphere of circulation. For Marx, the individual capitalist has power over 
the individual worker because his social class is stronger than the working class. For radical-
neoclassical economics, the capitalist has power over the worker because, at an interpersonal 
level, he is weaker than the latter and thus finds it convenient to buy his obedience.  
Within the sphere of circulation, there can be no production of value but only an 
exchange of equivalents. Therefore, if, in an equilibrium position, the individual capitalist has 
power over the individual worker, in the neoclassical conception, it is only because he pays 
for it. Before the exchange, this production factor belonged to the worker, like the labor power 
that he sells to the capitalist. After the exchange, power passes to the hands of the capitalist, 
and its monetary equivalent passes to the hands of the worker.  
To show that the capitalist has power over the worker during the working process, 
neoclassical economics must assume that the individual worker is not a member of the class 
of persons who have nothing to sell except their labor power. On the contrary, it must be 
assumed that he is a privileged person within this class (for instance, because of his human 
capital or because his work is difficult to monitor) who has something else to sell (his specific 
skills and his information asymmetries). Therefore, according to radical economists, pure 
sellers of labor power (common, unskilled workers) in a perfectly competitive labor market 
do not suffer any power relation because they have nothing to lose. Only skilled workers, or 
workers with specific capabilities or with information advantages, have wage privileges, 
which push them to give the maximum in the workplace and to accept a power relation under 
the employer. 
This bizarre conception shows that, in contrast to the claim of radical economists, 
power can only be an exception in this approach; it cannot be the rule. If all workers were 
really specific and difficult to monitor because of widespread imperfections in the DMC, no 
competitive wage in the market would exist. Therefore, the threat of being fired and losing the 
employment rent would not be credible, and the capitalist would have no power over the 
worker. Remember that in this theory of power, just as in the efficiency wages theory, the 
worker has as an incentive to work hard only if a lower (perfectly competitive) wage prevails 
in the labor market. In other words, this theory can, at best, explain why some particular 
workers suffer a power relation from their employer, but it cannot explain why workers in 
general suffer a power relation from capitalists. Thus, this approach cannot provide a general 
theory of power relations in capitalism. On the contrary, the demonstration that some 
individual workers suffer a power relation rests on the assumption that standard workers 
suffer no power relation. 
 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
Although the substantive theories of power that I have considered differ to some 
extent, I have argued that their common methodology leads to the same general conception, 
according to which power is an exception to Walrasian competition.  
The limits of this conception can be appreciated by considering the scientific question 
that these theories attempt to answer. The starting point of the debate is not the historical 
development of capitalist institutions but a theoretical model. In the Walrasian model, the 
firm is redundant, and power relations are invisible. These are the scientific problems to 
solve. The history of capitalism is not the object of the inquiry. Rather, the problem is to 
introduce firms and power in a model that works perfectly without them. In the debate on the 
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nature of capitalist institutions, this problem has raised questions: why does the firm exist? 
Where are its boundaries with the market? In the debate on power, suggestions have been 
presented less explicitly, but the underlying questions are of the same type: Why do power 
relations exist? Where are their boundaries with Walrasian competition? 
If the model of perfect and complete markets works without the firm, the only way to 
coherently introduce the firm is by making markets imperfect or incomplete. From the 
perspective of power relations, this means that power can only appear as a violation of the 
conditions of Walrasian competition. Power and competition are thus understood as 
alternative mechanisms of social coordination in a flat ontology in which the space occupied 
by one mechanism is necessarily subtracted from the other. The curious thing is that, 
notwithstanding this symmetry between power and competition, they are treated 
asymmetrically in concrete model building. Power and the firm are scientific problems, 
phenomena to explain. Competition and the market, by contrast, are starting points; they are 
assumptions that deserve no scientific explanation. This is why the nature of power and the 
firm has been the object of scientific discussion, whereas a debate on the nature of 
competition and the market has not even begun within mainstream economics. 
To demonstrate the limits of this narrow conception of power based on the 
neoclassical method, I have contrasted it with Marx's conception of capitalism as a system of 
social relations based on power and exploitation. Marx's dialectic aims to explain the relation 
between the social condition of exploitation of the working class and the power relation 
suffered by the individual worker. By contrast, in the neoclassical conception, there is no 
exploitation (in fact, the exploited person might be the capitalist who pays rent, but surely not 
the worker who receives it). The only workers who really suffer power relations are those 
with a privileged set of endowments with respect to the army of pure sellers of labor power. 
The power relation suffered by the (qualified) worker, in this approach, is not caused by his 
participation in an exploited class but by his privileged position within this class. In a 
nutshell, the worker suffers a power relation not because of his social weakness but because 
of his individual strength. 
Marx repeatedly criticized the bourgeois political economy for its tendency to analyze 
production with the lenses of circulation and for its inability to understand the historical 
development of the capitalist mode of production and the dialectical relation between social 
and interpersonal relations. Neoclassical theorists, even when declaring affinities with Marx, 
do not attempt to address these critiques. On the contrary, their models with imperfections are 
simply a more sophisticated version of the same old views of the "free trader vulgaris". 
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